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Abstract 
Nuclear fuel cycle of fast reactors contains materials which potentially can be used for fabricating nuclear explosives or nuclear weapons. 
It is customary to apply to such materials in addressing the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism the 
concept of attractiveness allowing evaluating potential possibility of their use in clandestine activities. Attractiveness of nuclear materials 
is evaluated, first of all, according to their neutronics properties. Results are presented of analysis of attractiveness of different types of 
fuel compositions as applicable to fuel cycle of fast sodium-cooled high-power nuclear reactor of the BN-1200 type for different options 
of its starting fuel loads and utilized regimes for reaching steady-state fuel composition. The object of the present study were the simplest 
systems containing fuel compositions of fast reactor of BN-1200 type in the form of bare spherical assemblies without neutron reflector and 
assemblies surrounded with simplest neutron reflectors. Criticality conditions were determined for each system and main neutronics properties 
of the fuel compositions under examination were determined for these criticality conditions. 
Copyright © 2016, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by 
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Keywords: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; Attractiveness of nuclear materials; Fast sodium-cooled high-power reactor; Uranium oxide fuel; Uranium 
nitride fuel; Mixed oxide uranium–plutonium fuel; Mixed nitride uranium–plutonium fuel; Critical assembly; Neutron reflector; Critical mass; Beryllium; 
Tungsten. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B  
t  
l  
p  
r  
B  
o
 
r  
n  
i  
h  Introduction 
Power units equipped with fast reactors are capable to
significantly expand the fuel resources for nuclear power
generation and to reduce the volumes of accumulated ra-
dioactive wastes due to the organization of the closed nuclear
fuel cycle. Only very few countries possess fast reactor
technologies with Russia being the world leader in this
field. It is sufficient to note the successful operation by the
Beloyarskaya NPP during 35 years of BN-600 - the only
working fast reactor in the world, which is, indisputably, the
world class achievement. Construction of fast sodium-cooled∗ Corresponding author. 
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o the power grids and operations for reaching 100% power
evel conducted as of the present moment demonstrate new
rogress achieved by Russia in the implementation of fast
eactor technologies [1-5] . BN-800 reactor in contrast to
N-600 will be operated with MOX-fuel load and elements
f the closed fuel cycle will be developed [2,6] . 
Nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) of fast reactors contains mate-
ials which can potentially be used for fabricating primitive
uclear explosives (NE) and, with certain additional process-
ng, for fabricating nuclear weapons (NW) as well [3,7] . It
as to be taken into consideration here that potential prolif-
rators at the level of state will attempt to develop functional
nd powerful enough nuclear weapon with comparatively
oderate mass and dimensions in order to be able to deliver
he weapon beyond the limits of the country. [3,8–10] . Such
tate will, evidently, be developing technologies for addi-
ional significant processing of the nuclear material extracted
rom fuel cycle of nuclear power generation because without
mplementation of additional processing such materials havescow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by Elsevier 
vecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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t  omparatively large values of critical mass. On the other
and, it can be assumed that the purpose of sub-national
nd/or terrorist groups is to fabricate primitive nuclear
harge from stolen nuclear materials without their prelimi-
ary serious technological processing, because deployment 
f such nuclear charge is intended on the territory of the
ountry in question and its transportation to the place of
he act of terror will be achieved using all available means
4,11–15] . 
Nuclear materials capable to sustain chain fission reaction
ith comparatively modest values of critical mass are, cer-
ainly, of interest for the present analysis. Existence of critical
ass is the key property of the material and is the necessary
ut not sufficient condition of “attractiveness” in the selection
f material for its unauthorized use [16] . 
Besides the critical mass which must have certain real-
stic value allowing performing transportation of the nuclear
xplosive by this or that available means to the place of crim-
nal act, neutron background and level of heat release are the
mportant characteristics of nuclear materials from the view-
oint of their diversion. Neutron background of nuclear ma-
erial is generated due to the spontaneous fission of heavy
uclei, for the most part of uranium and plutonium. Addi-
ional neutron yield takes place due to ( α-n) reactions on light
lements, for the most part on oxygen. With high enough
eutron background the probability of initiation of nuclear
xplosion accompanied with significant energy yield is very
ow because high neutron background will inevitably result
n the premature initiation of chain fission reaction, i.e. in the
re-detonation, which practically excludes the possibility of
btaining the nominal energy yield [17] . 
Heat release, i.e. heating of nuclear material, takes place,
or the most part, due to α-decay and other processes of de-
ay of heavy isotopes contained in the material. Significant
eating of the material makes it difficult to handle it, but
he main factor here are the effects of high temperature on
he layer of chemical explosive directly adjacent to the nu-
lear material. At sufficiently high temperature this explosive
oses its properties and destroys functionality of the nuclear
harge. Undertaking different tricks is possible for reducing
he temperature, but, however, they inevitably lead to the loss
f simplicity of the design [18] . 
Besides the above examined characteristics of nuclear ma-
erials affecting the dimensions, mass and functionality of
uclear charge, it is necessary to mention radioactive back-
round which practically does not affect the dimensions and
unctionality but complicates handling such material by po-
ential proliferators and, at the same time, makes it easier to
etect such radioactive material. 
Results of analysis of attractiveness of fuel compositions
f fast sodium-cooled high-power nuclear reactor of BN-1200
ype according to their main neutronics properties are dis-
ussed in the present paper. Technological factors associated
ith additional processing of materials within the NFC are
he object for subsequent studies. Calculation studies were
erformed using the MMKKENO code. nput data 
Attractiveness of nuclear materials is determined by the
eutronics properties inherent to these materials and al-
owing initiating self-sustained chain fission reaction [16] .
he following properties were examined in the present
tudy: critical mass (M); inherent neutron background (NB);
eat release (HR); radioactivity ( А). The following fuel
ompositions which may be utilized in loading the nuclear
eactor under discussion were examined: uranium dioxide
UO 2 ), uranium nitride (UN), mixed oxide uranium-plutonium
uel ((U + Pu)O 2 , МОХ ) and mixed nitride uranium-plutonium
uel ((U + Pu)N, MNUP). 
Isotopic compositions were determined for the neutronics
alculations of the fuel compositions for the following condi-
ions: fresh fuel loaded in the reactor core and in the blankets
fresh fuel load); irradiated fuel unloaded from the reactor
fter the first completed fuel residence in the core (fuel un-
oading). 
Isotopic composition of fresh UO 2 fuel (%) is following:
35 U 17.8; 238 U 82.2. Isotopic composition of UO 2 fuel un-
oaded from the reactor after the first completed fuel residence
n the core (%): 235 U – 9.87; 236 U – 1.75; 238 U – 74.7; 238 Pu
2.16 ·10 –2 ; 239 Pu – 4.6; 240 Pu – 0.354; 241 Pu – 1.74 ·10 –2 ;
42 Pu – 6.33 ·10 –4 ; 241 Am – 8.07 ·10 −4 ; 243 Am – 1.93 ·10 –5 ;
37 Np – 0.134; 239 Np – 1.45 ·10 –2 ; 235 U fission products
9.56. 
Isotopic composition of fresh UN fuel is following (%):
35 U – 14.4; 238 U – 85,6. Isotopic composition of UN fuel
nloaded from the reactor after the first completed fuel res-
dence in the core (%): 235 U – 7.81; 236 U – 1.26; 238 U
79.0; 238 Pu – 1.36 ·10 –2 ; 239 Pu – 4.11; 240 Pu – 0.266; 241 Pu
1.29 ·10 –2 ; 242 Pu – 3.91 ·10 –4 ; 241 Am – 6.08 ·10 –4 ; 243 Am
1.11 ·10 –5 ; 237 Np – 9.59 ·10 –2 ; 239 Np – 1.27 ·10 –2 ; 244 С m
5.38 ·10 –7 ; 235 U fission products – 7.55. 
Isotopic composition of fresh МОХ -fuel (%) is following:
35 U – 8.18 ·10 –2 ; 238 U – 82.7; 238 Pu – 0.256; 239 Pu – 10.5;
40 Pu – 4.26; 241 Pu –1.3; 242 Pu – 0.852. Isotopic composition
f MOX-fuel unloaded from the reactor after the first com-
leted fuel residence in the core (%): 235 U – 3.65 ·10 –2 ; 236 U
8.99 ·10 –3 ; 238 U – 73.8; 238 Pu – 0.17; 239 Pu – 10.0; 240 Pu
4.65; 241 Pu – 0.884; 242 Pu – 0.809; 241 Am – 0.146; 243 Am
0.103; 239 Np – 1.7 ·10 –2 ; 244 С m – 1.84 ·10 –2 ; 239 Pu fission
roducts – 9.3. 
Isotopic composition of fresh mixed nitride uranium-
lutonium fuel (MNUP-fuel) (%) is following: 235 U 8.64 ·–
0 –2 ; 238 U – 86.4; 238 Pu – 0.202; 239 Pu – 8.29; 240 Pu –
.35; 241 Pu – 0.973; 242 Pu – 0.669; 241 Am – 4.76 ·10 –4 . Iso-
opic composition of MNUP-fuel unloaded from the reactor
fter the first completed fuel residence in the core (%): 235 U
0.785; 236 U – 4.18 ·10 –2 ; 238 U – 8.68 ·10 –3 ; 238 Pu – 0.145;
39 Pu – 8.78; 240 Pu – 3.63; 241 Pu – 0.672; 242 Pu – 0.63;
41 Am – 0.14; 243 Am – 7.23 ·10 –2 ; 239 Np 1.51 ·– 10 –2 ; 244 С m
1.11 ·10 –2 ; 239 Pu fission products– 7.43. 
It has to be noted that in accordance with the calcula-
ion procedure accepted in the present calculation critical
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Table 1 
Characteristics of critical system with uranium oxide fuel. 
Parameter Fresh load Unloaded fuel 
Without reflector Reflector material Without reflector Reflector material 
Be 10 cm W 10 cm Be 10 cm W 10 cm 
R cr , cm 32.20 21.15 27.4 37.82 30.08 31.2 
M cr , kg 1454 412 896 2356 1186 1323 
NB, 1/s 1.47 ·10 4 0.43 ·10 4 0.90 ·10 4 2.13 ·10 7 1.07 ·10 7 1.20 ·10 7 
HR, W 2 · 10 –2 0.006 0.013 502.65 253.05 282.27 
A, Ci 0.85 0.24 0.52 7.07 ·10 7 3.56 ·10 7 3.97 ·10 7 
Table 2 
Characteristics of critical system with uranium nitride fuel. 
Parameter Fresh load Unloaded fuel 
Without reflector Reflector material Without reflector Reflector material 
Be 10 cm W 10 cm Be 10 cm W 10 cm 
R cr , cm 39.90 26.8 33.85 42.70 33.9 37.78 
M cr , kg 3246 984 1982 3979 1990 2756 
NB, 1/s 3.35 ·10 4 1.01 ·10 4 2.04 ·10 4 2.61 ·10 7 1.31 ·10 7 1.81 ·10 7 
HR, W 0.04 0.013 0.027 630.50 315.31 436.70 
A, Ci 1.71 0.52 1.05 1.04 ·10 8 5.22 ·10 7 7.23 ·10 7 
Table 3 
Characteristics of critical system with МОХ -fuel. 
Parameter Fresh load Unloaded fuel 
Without reflector Reflector material Without reflector Reflector material 
Be 10 cm W 10 cm Be 10 cm W 10 cm 
R cr , cm 29.50 20.33 25.20 34.39 27.85 30.65 
M cr , kg 1118 366 697 1772 941 1254 
NB, 1/s 1.08 ·10 8 3.54 ·10 7 6.75 ·10 7 9.50 ·10 9 5.05 ·10 9 6.72 ·10 9 
HR, W 1.96 ·10 3 0.64 ·10 3 1.22 ·10 3 3.47 ·10 3 1.84 ·10 3 2.46 ·10 3 
A, Ci 1.38 ·10 6 4.52 ·10 5 8.60 ·10 5 6.38 ·10 7 3.39 ·10 7 4.52 ·10 7 
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o  conditions of the system and its critical mass were determined
in the first place. All remaining characteristics (heat release,
neutron background, activity) were calculated as applicable to
the critical mass of the fuel composition and with changing
critical mass these values factually change proportionally
to the fuel composition in question. If needed, obtaining
specific characteristics is not difficult to accomplish. 
Results of calculations of neutronics characteristics 
of critical systems with fast reactor fuel compositions 
Results of calculations of neutronics characteristics of crit-
ical systems without neutron reflectors and with neutron re-
flectors containing fuel compositions of fast sodium-cooled
nuclear reactor of BN-1200 type are presented in the present
section for the preset conditions of fuel compositions under
examination. Beryllium (Be) and tungsten (W) were examined
as the reflector materials. Reflector thickness was accepted to
be equal to 10 cm. Results are summarized in Tables 1–4 . 
Analysis of the calculated results obtained for “bare” sys-
tems demonstrates that critical mass exceeds one ton for the
examined fuel compositions. Fresh МОХ -fuel has the smallestritical mass equal to 1118 kg among the examined fuel com-
ositions. For fresh and irradiated uranium nitride fuel critical
ass is the largest among the examined fuel compositions and
xceeds three tons. Under fuel irradiation in the reactor core
he value of its critical mass increases due to the burn-up of
ain fissile isotopes and accumulation of fission products. 
Comparison of fuel compositions on the basis of uranium
emonstrates that for nitride fuel critical mass of system with-
ut neutron reflector is by approximately two times larger than
hat for oxide fuel. This can be explained by higher density
f nitride fuel and, as the result, by its smaller enrichment as
ompared to oxide fuel. As it is known, for systems with fast
eutron spectrum value of critical mass is inversely propor-
ional to the square of the density of material of the system
19] . 
Approximately the same regularity is observed for mixed
ranium–plutonium fuel compositions (MOX- and MNUP-
uel) as in the comparison of compositions of uranium oxide
nd uranium nitride fuel. 
Neutron background was calculated taking into account the
ollowing two nuclear physics processes: spontaneous fission
f heavy nuclei and ( α-n)-reactions on oxygen. Such reaction
E.M. Lvova, A.N. Chebeskov / Nuclear Energy and Technology 2 (2016) 214–218 217 
Table 4 
Characteristics of critical system with MNUP-fuel. 
Parameter Fresh load Unloaded fuel 
Without reflector Reflector material Without reflector Reflector material 
Be 10 cm W 10 cm Be 10 cm W 10 cm 
R cr , cm 36.00 25.57 30.66 38.05 30.80 33.5 
M cr , kg 2384 854 1473 2815 1493 1920 
NB, 1/s 1.08 ·10 8 0.44 ·10 8 0.67 ·10 8 1.01 ·10 10 5.35 ·10 9 6.88 ·10 9 
HR, W 3.41 ·10 3 1.25 ·10 3 2.10 ·10 3 4.36 ·10 3 2.31 ·10 3 2.97 ·10 3 
A, Ci 2.21 ·10 6 0.79 ·10 6 1.37 ·10 6 8.96 ·10 7 4.75 ·10 7 6.11 ·10 7 
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b  n nitrogen does not produce any noticeable neutron yield.
he main contribution in the neutron background is produced
y even plutonium isotopes. As it was originally expected,
eutron background for fresh uranium fuel for the critical
ystem without neutron reflector has the smallest value equal
o ∼10 4 1/s for the critical mass. For the examined case the
alue for nitride fuel is by more than two times higher than for
xide fuel. For fresh compositions of MOX- and MNUP-fuel
eutron background for the critical system without neutron
eflector amounts to ∼10 8 1/s for the critical mass. Such in-
rease of neutron background as compared to uranium fuel is
ssociated with presence of even plutonium isotopes in MOX-
nd in MNUP-fuel. Under irradiation of fuel compositions
n the nuclear reactor values of neutron background of the
ritical system without neutron reflector increase for uranium
uel by approximately three orders of magnitude because of
he appearance of plutonium isotopes and by approximately
ne order of magnitude for mixed uranium-plutonium fuel
ecause of the increased fraction of even plutonium isotopes.
Heat release in fuel compositions is associated with pres-
nce in them of 238 Pu as well as of americium and curium
sotopes. However, contribution of the latter does not con-
titute a significant value because of their comparatively low
oncentration in the fuel. Because of the absence of plutonium
eat release for the critical system without neutron reflector
s fairly insignificant for fresh compositions of oxide and ni-
ride uranium fuel and amounts to several hundredths of watt
or the critical mass. Under irradiation of uranium fuel in the
eactor heat release is significantly increased mainly due to
he accumulated 238 Pu isotope reaching several hundred watts
or the fuel critical mass. For MOX- and MNUP-fuel level of
eat release amounts for fresh fuel to the value of the order of
everal hundred watts and increases under burn-up reaching
he highest values for spent fuel at the level of 300–500 W
or the critical mass. 
Activity of critical systems without neutron reflector con-
aining fresh uranium fuel is not high and does not exceed one
urie for critical mass of oxide fuel and two curies for critical
ass of nitride fuel. With burn-up activity sharply increases
eaching ∼10 8 curies for the fuel critical mass. For systems
ontaining fresh MOX- and MNUP-fuel activity amounts to
10 6 curies increasing by approximately two orders of mag-
itude with burn-up which is valid to the same extent both
or systems containing MOX-fuel and for systems containing
NUP-fuel. Efficiency of material used as the reflector is determined
y the mean free path of neutrons before scattering in this
aterial. The smaller is this value the better is the reflector.
fficiency of neutron reflector depends not only on the ma-
erial but, as well, on its thickness. The most efficient are
hicknesses within the limits of three mean neutron free path
alues for the material in question. For larger thicknesses ef-
ciency of neutron reflector is reduced and further increase
f its dimensions does not produce noticeable gain in the re-
uction of critical mass of the system [20] . 
Beryllium is the most efficient neutron reflector. It espe-
ially efficiently reduces the critical mass for systems contain-
ng fresh fuel compositions – approximately to 30% of the
ritical mass for the “bare” system. For uranium oxide fuel
ritical mass with beryllium reflector is reduced to the values
ust a little larger than 400 kg. Taking into account the small
eutron background, heat release and activity such fuel com-
osition may be of certain interest for proliferators. Critical
ass with beryllium reflector is even smaller for fresh MOX-
uel – it is slightly higher than 350 kg. And, although such
uel composition has significantly higher neutron background 
nd heat release as compared with uranium fuel, it can also be
f certain interest for proliferators. For nitride fuel composi-
ions with neutron reflector made of beryllium critical masses
re larger and amount to about 980 and 850 kg for uranium
nd for MNUP-fuel, respectively. 
For fuel compositions which underwent burn-up (unloaded
fter the first residence in the reactor core) efficiency of beryl-
ium as neutron reflector is somewhat lower – within ∼50%
f the critical mass for the “bare” system. Here, critical mass
or practically all fuel compositions is approximately by two
imes larger as compared to their fresh compositions. 
Efficiency of tungsten reflector in terms of reduction of
ritical mass is significantly lower as compared with beryl-
ium. 
It was noted in the investigation of neutron background
nd heat release for the examined fuel compositions that for
resh uranium fuel compositions (oxide and nitride) values
f neutron background and heat release are comparatively
ot high and they, in all likelihood, would not be able to
reate any problems for potential proliferators. In this case
he main hindrance will be the comparatively large value
f the critical mass. However, if enrichment technology is
vailable for the potential proliferators this hindrance can
e overcome by additional enrichment of fresh uranium fuel
218 E.M. Lvova, A.N. Chebeskov / Nuclear Energy and Technology 2 (2016) 214–218 
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 to higher values with comparatively small expenditures for
performing the separation work [3] . 
For fresh and irradiated mixed-fuel compositions (MOX-
and MNUP-fuel), as well as for irradiated composition of ura-
nium oxide and nitride fuel values of neutron background and
heat release become fairly insignificant for critical assemblies
with neutron reflectors and, together with increased critical
mass, will represent practically insurmountable barrier if at-
tempt is made by proliferators to use then for fabricating a
nuclear explosive. 
Activity of fresh uranium fuel (both oxide and nitride) is
not high and does not exceed 1 Ci for critical mass of the
system equipped with neutron reflector. Under burn-up activ-
ity sharply increases reaching ∼5 · 10 7 Ci for the fuel critical
mass. For fresh mixed uranium–plutonium compositions ac-
tivity of the critical system with neutron reflector amounts to
∼10 6 Ci increasing by approximately one-two orders of mag-
nitude with fuel burn-up which is true to the same degree
both for critical mass of MOX-fuel and for critical mass of
MNUP-fuel. 
Conclusions 
Calculation analysis demonstrated that the examined fuel
compositions which can be used in loading high-power fast
sodium-cooled nuclear reactor of BN-1200 type have large
enough critical mass exceeding one ton and more. If simplest
neutron reflectors are used critical mass for the examined fuel
compositions is reduced by approximately two times but, nev-
ertheless, remains to be fairly significant. Fresh oxide fuel
with beryllium reflector with 10-cm thickness has the small-
est critical mass among uranium fuel compositions equal to
∼400 kg and, taking into account the small values of neutron
background, heat release and activity, this fuel composition
may represent certain interest for sub-national and/or terrorist
organizations. 
Attention must be attracted to the isotopic composition of
plutonium accumulated in the fast reactor core when uranium
fuel is used as the starting reactor fuel load. Plutonium with
high concentration of 239 Pu equal to ∼93% is generated in the
spent uranium fuel after the first fuel residence in the core.
Rejection of the use of blankets in the fast reactor does not
help resolving this problem and, factually, shifts breeding of
conditioned plutonium into the reactor core with much higher
productivity. Therefore, additional research of the problem un-
der discussion is required prior to putting uranium-loaded fast
reactors into operation. 
As applicable to nuclear energy complex in Russia, the
conditions during fabrication of uranium fuel for fast reactors,
as well as during transportation of such fuel to NPPs includ-
ing fuel handling operations conducted on NPP site prior touel loading in the reactor core and after it’s unloading from
he core require special attention and protection. 
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